Shanghai Cooperation Summit 2025: Xi Hosts Modi and Putin in a New Global Order

In late August 2025, China’s northern port city of Tianjin transformed into a hub of global diplomacy as President Xi Jinping welcomed over twenty world leaders for a highly anticipated Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit . Among the attendees were Russia’s Vladimir Putin and India’s Narendra Modi, whose presence underscored the significance of this gathering. With these major powers at his side, Xi leveraged statecraft, military pageantry, and historical symbolism to project China’s growing influence on the world stage. The summit – followed by a grand military parade in Beijing days later – sent a clear message: an emerging cohort of nations in the Global South is coalescing to shape a new multipolar world order, one not centered on Washington or the West .

A “Fuller House” Summit in Tianjin

Flags of SCO member and partner countries on display at a previous SCO meeting venue. The 2025 summit in Tianjin was the largest in the organization’s history, drawing leaders from across Asia and beyond.

The SCO summit in Tianjin (August 31 – September 1, 2025) was the largest since the bloc’s founding in 2001, marking the first time so many heads of state had convened under its banner . Originally born as a security pact (the “Shanghai Five”) to settle post-Soviet border disputes, the SCO has steadily expanded its membership and its mission . By 2025 it counted 10 member states – including China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and the newest entrants Iran (joined 2023) and Belarus (2024) – alongside observer nations and dialogue partners ranging from Central Asia to the Middle East and Southeast Asia . SCO countries now represent about 43% of the world’s population and nearly a quarter of global GDP, giving the bloc considerable heft on paper .

What truly set this summit apart was the breadth of participation. More than 20 foreign leaders and chiefs of international organizations were in attendance, making it a record turnout for the SCO . Leaders from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan), South Asia (India, Pakistan), East Asia (China), and important partners like Türkiye, Indonesia, Malaysia, Egypt, and Qatar all gathered under China’s auspices . United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres was also present . This diverse guest list signaled the SCO’s evolution from a narrow regional security forum into a broad platform for global cooperation. In Tianjin, economic integration and diplomatic coordination were as prominent on the agenda as traditional security matters, reflecting an expanded remit that now includes trade, infrastructure, and finance initiatives among member states .

Chinese officials cast the summit as one of the nation’s most important diplomatic events of the year . Indeed, the “optics and symbolism” of so many leaders convening in China – notably without any direct Western participation – was itself a triumph for Beijing’s foreign policy . Xi Jinping’s government has promoted the SCO as a cornerstone of a more inclusive, multipolar international system. At a time when U.S.-led alliances dominate many global institutions, the SCO offers an alternative framework centered in Eurasia. As one analyst observed, “This is a time when the US is burning bridges with almost every country. So, in President Xi’s mind, it is a good time for China to position itself as a world power by showcasing it has productive relations with many countries… China always tries to make friends where it can.” The Tianjin summit vividly showcased that “friend-making” strategy: China positioning itself as a convener of nations spanning the Global South, capable of uniting diverse countries under its leadership to “counterbalance the West, particularly the US.”

India’s Balancing Act: Modi between East and West

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi made headlines by attending the 2025 SCO summit – his first visit to China in seven years . Just a year earlier, India-China relations were so strained that Modi skipped the 2024 SCO meeting. But the geopolitical calculus changed markedly in the interim . One catalyst was the trade conflict with Washington: U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration hit India with steep 50% tariffs on its exports (punishment for New Delhi buying Russian oil), jolting India’s economy and strategic outlook . Facing these pressures, Modi’s government sought to “hedge” against Western sanctions and protectionism by mending fences with Beijing and Moscow . As a result, late 2024 saw tentative thawing of India-China ties, opening the door for Modi’s prominent presence in Tianjin.

During the summit, Modi held a crucial bilateral meeting with Xi Jinping aimed at stabilizing the often fraught India-China relationship. Both leaders struck a conciliatory tone. Modi affirmed India’s commitment to “progressing our relations based on mutual respect, trust and sensitivities”, emphasizing that India and China pursue strategic autonomy and should not view their ties “through the lens of a third country.” This was a pointed reference to the United States – a signal that India would not be boxed in as a proxy for Washington’s China containment strategy. Xi Jinping, for his part, agreed that the two Asian giants should see each other as partners rather than rivals, declaring that bilateral ties could be “stable and far-reaching” if they focused on cooperation and managed disputes calmly .

Notably, both sides cited progress on their longstanding Himalayan border dispute, where a military standoff in 2020 had brought relations to a nadir . Modi welcomed the creation of an atmosphere of “peace and stability” after successful disengagement of troops in frontier areas, and mentioned new agreements on border management and confidence-building measures . Symbolic steps were taken to rebuild trust: direct flights between India and China, suspended since 2020, were slated to resume, and China lifted export curbs on certain Indian imports (like rare earths and fertilizers) during a visit by its foreign minister Wang Yi . Beijing even allowed Indian pilgrims to again visit sacred sites in Tibet – a goodwill gesture after years of visa restrictions . Such moves indicate both Asian powers are seeking a “new equilibrium” in their relations , cooling tensions in recognition of larger strategic interests.

Yet, India’s participation in the summit was not a wholesale pivot away from the West but rather a balancing act. Modi’s government remains part of forums like the U.S-led Quad and maintains strong ties with Washington and its allies. However, by visibly aligning with China and Russia at the SCO – even if temporarily – New Delhi underscored its desire for multipolarity, refusing to be tethered to any one camp. Analysts noted that Modi and Xi were keen to project a united front against Western pressure at Tianjin . For Xi, having India on board lent credibility to the SCO’s claim of representing more than just a Sino-Russian club. For Modi, the summit offered leverage: it signaled to Washington that India has other options if treated as a junior partner. Indeed, U.S. observers watched Modi’s interactions with Xi “particularly closely,” aware that Trump’s trade war had “forced New Delhi to seek stronger partnerships with Beijing and other players in Eurasia.”

Putin’s Rare Trip and the Sino-Russian Entente

If India’s role was one of cautious engagement, Russia’s presence at the Tianjin summit was one of full-throated strategic alignment with China. President Vladimir Putin arrived to great fanfare – a red-carpet welcome on the tarmac – beginning an unusually long four-day state visit to China . It was Putin’s first trip outside the former Soviet sphere (and one of the longest abroad) since the start of the Ukraine war in 2022. For Moscow, isolated by Western sanctions and diplomatic censure, the SCO summit offered a much-needed stage to show that Russia still has powerful friends. Chinese state media heralded Putin’s arrival by proclaiming that China-Russia ties are at their “best in history,” calling their partnership “the most stable, mature and strategically significant among major countries”. Such effusive language underlined Beijing’s political support for Moscow even as Russia remains a pariah in Western capitals.

At the summit, Xi and Putin presented a tightly unified front. President Xi positioned the SCO forum as a showcase of what a “post-American-led international order” could look like – implicitly with a dominant role for China and Russia. Both leaders have been explicit in their shared goal of counterbalancing U.S. power. In a message timed with his visit, Putin blasted Western sanctions in an interview with China’s Xinhua News, and China echoed opposition to “discriminatory” trade curbs, with Xi pointedly using the summit to give Russia a high-profile diplomatic boost despite its pariah status . The two countries’ coordination is grounded in hard interests: China has helped cushion Russia’s economy by purchasing discounted Russian oil and gas and supplying “dual-use” technologies, while Russia provides China with a geopolitical partner to jointly resist Western pressure . Their oft-cited “no limits” partnership, announced just before the Ukraine conflict, appears to be holding strong .

Putin’s trip culminated not only in summit meetings but also in his prominent attendance at China’s massive Victory Day military parade in Beijing on September 3, commemorating 80 years since Japan’s defeat in WWII. The image of Xi and Putin standing together on Tiananmen Square, reviewing columns of Chinese troops, sent a defiant signal to the West . Adding to that tableau, Xi also invited North Korea’s leader Kim Jong-un to the parade – Kim’s first international foray in years and his first-ever group summit with other heads of state . Though Kim did not attend the SCO summit itself, his presence at the parade alongside Xi and Putin symbolized an informal axis of countries aligned against U.S. dominance. In fact, some Western analysts dubbed the gathering of China, Russia, North Korea (and Iran) an emerging “Axis of Upheaval” – a loose coalition of states bent on reshaping the Western-led order and undermining U.S. interests . All three of those nations (plus Iran and Myanmar) are under heavy Western sanctions, and they have increasingly provided economic or military lifelines to each other in defiance of Western pressure . The Tianjin summit and Beijing parade highlighted this growing entente: Beijing, Moscow, and even Pyongyang finding common cause in challenging the West’s policies, from NATO expansion to trade sanctions.

Crucially, Russia’s alignment with China through the SCO does not mean all member states unanimously back Moscow’s agenda – but most have tilted away from the Western position on conflicts like Ukraine. With Putin in the room, the summit avoided any direct condemnation of Russia’s war. In fact, many SCO members have echoed or tolerated Russia’s narratives: for instance, China and most Central Asian states refrain from condemning the Ukraine invasion, and India maintains a neutral stance – it calls for peace yet continues to buy record volumes of Russian oil . This tacit support within the SCO frustrates Western officials, as it blunts the impact of their sanctions. Putin’s warm reception in China, despite being wanted by the International Criminal Court for war crimes, underscored that within this non-Western bloc, he is treated as a valued partner, not a pariah .

Unity and Underlying Tensions within the SCO

For all the talk of solidarity, the SCO is not a monolith. Its strength – a diverse coalition spanning Eurasia – is also a source of internal friction, as each nation has its own interests. China and Russia may be aligned on big-picture opposition to U.S. hegemony, but India’s goals differ (e.g. counterterrorism and checking Pakistan) and so do those of the Central Asian republics (who seek investment and security guarantees) . This was evident on certain contentious issues. Consensus eluded the group on how to address the Ukraine war – Russia expected solidarity, but India quietly pushed for language on peace and sovereignty . Likewise on Middle East conflicts, Iran and China’s strong stance against Israel was not fully shared by India, which has friendly ties with Israel; New Delhi actually vetoed an SCO statement condemning Israel’s actions in Gaza earlier in the year . And ever-present is the rivalry between India and Pakistan: just weeks before the summit, the two nearly came to blows over border skirmishes in Kashmir. At India’s insistence, the SCO has had to grapple with statements on cross-border terrorism – with India demanding Pakistan be called out, something Pakistan (and China, its ally) resisted . In one episode, when the SCO failed to jointly condemn a militant attack India blames on Pakistan, New Delhi refused to sign the customary communiqué at a ministerial meeting . Such disputes demonstrate the limits of cooperation among countries that are strategic competitors in other arenas.

Despite these challenges, Beijing managed the 2025 summit carefully to emphasize common ground and play down differences. The overarching theme promoted was one of multilateralism, South-South cooperation, and shared development. Even if concrete policy agreements were modest, the symbolism of unity took center stage. According to many observers, that symbolism was arguably the summit’s main deliverable. “I doubt that this organisation is able to get much deeper than just the symbolism of gathering as a platform for the Global South… What we’re going to see is more about the optics of having all these countries together amid the United States’s absence,” noted one analyst presciently . In Tianjin, those optics were on full display: leaders smiled for group photos, bilateral meetings proliferated on the sidelines, and not a word was uttered in public that might mar the image of SCO harmony. Any divisions among members were papered over by the shared interest in presenting a united front in the face of Western criticism . In this way, the SCO summit reinforced China’s narrative that it can mediate and lead a diverse coalition of nations – an implicit contrast to the discord and deadlock often seen in Western-dominated forums.

Military Might and Historical Memory as Diplomacy

The Tianjin summit was only part one of China’s grand diplomatic showcase that week. Part two came on September 3, when Xi hosted a spectacular military parade in Beijing to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in Asia . By timing the SCO gathering to coincide with this Victory Day celebration, Beijing intertwined its contemporary geopolitical messaging with the powerful imagery of historical triumph. The parade – the largest China had staged in recent years – featured tens of thousands of PLA troops, over 100 military aircraft, advanced missiles and tanks rolling down Chang’an Avenue . It served to showcase China’s modern military prowess not only to its own citizens but also to the visiting dignitaries.

Chinese People’s Liberation Army soldiers drilling for the WWII Victory Day parade in Beijing, 2025. The grand military display, attended by Putin and other sanctioned leaders, underscored China’s use of historical commemorations to project strength and unity against Western pressure.

Significantly, nearly all the SCO summit VIPs were invited to stay for the parade, blurring the line between a regional forum and a global rally of China’s allies . Many did remain in Beijing, including Putin (touted as the parade’s “star guest”), leaders of Iran and Belarus, and others . However, a few notable figures left before the martial fanfare: India’s Modi and Turkey’s President Erdoğan departed China rather than be seen at a military pageant alongside China’s top brass . Their absence at the parade reflected a careful calibration – for India and Turkey, full public military alignment with China would have sent problematic signals to the West. Instead, taking their places on the dais were the likes of Kim Jong-un, Aleksandar Vučić of Serbia, Robert Fico of Slovakia, and leaders of Myanmar, Cuba, the DR Congo and more . Virtually no major Western leaders attended (Slovakia’s and Serbia’s were the only Europeans present), underscoring the East-West divide on display .

Framed against the solemn commemoration of WWII’s end, Xi’s choice of guests sent a pointed message. The original World War II Allies may have included the U.S. and UK, but in Beijing’s 2025 narrative, the torch of anti-fascist victory was being held aloft by China, Russia, and their partners. By invoking history, Xi tapped into nationalist sentiment and a sense of shared struggle: China’s victory over Japanese militarism 80 years ago, and today, a perceived struggle against Western dominance. The presence of sanctioned leaders (Putin, Kim, Iran’s president) at the parade signified a “show of solidarity against the West”, as Reuters noted . It was as if those nations most ostracized by Washington were proudly standing shoulder-to-shoulder, refusing to be isolated. “Xi Jinping is trying to showcase that he is very strong… a global leader,” observed a Singapore-based analyst, noting how Xi, once a regional politician who “looked up to Putin”, was now hosting Putin and others as peers in a grand international spectacle . In sum, the military parade – rich in historical symbolism and hard power display – complemented the SCO summit’s diplomatic discussions. Together, they reinforced China’s central theme: that it now has both the political clout and military muscle to champion a new world order with or without the West’s blessing .

Toward a Multipolar Global Order

By the week’s end, the message emanating from Tianjin and Beijing was unmistakable. The combination of the SCO summit and the Victory Day parade under Xi’s orchestration amounted to a declaration of a shifting global landscape. The assembled leaders – from Xi, Putin, and Modi to those of Central Asia, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia – signaled that a “Global South” coalition is asserting itself on the world stage . These nations share a desire for greater autonomy in international affairs and often a resentment of Western lectures on democracy or human rights. Under China’s guidance, they are articulating a vision of multipolarity: one in which no single superpower (read: the United States) can dictate terms unilaterally . As an SCO analyst put it, “the world is clearly in deep flux… you’re likely to see China or Russia make the case that the world is entering an era of multipolarity” .

Central to this vision is a different approach to security and governance. The SCO’s rhetoric emphasizes “indivisible security” – the idea that one country’s security should not come at the expense of another’s . This stands in contrast to Western military alliances like NATO, which Russia and China argue create zero-sum blocs . In practical terms, China and Russia are demanding respect for “spheres of influence”: for example, that the U.S. and NATO stay out of what Moscow considers its backyard in Eastern Europe, or that Washington not meddle in Asian disputes near China’s borders . The SCO forum allowed these powers to champion multilateralism on their own terms. Beijing and Moscow cast themselves as defenders of the U.N. Charter and international law – even as the West accuses Russia of violating those in Ukraine – and accuse the U.S. of unilateral coercive measures (like sanctions and tariffs) that undermine the global rules . By coming together in high-profile settings like Tianjin, the SCO leaders aimed to legitimize their approach and demonstrate that they have the collective weight to back it up.

For the United States and its allies, the spectacle in China was a wake-up call. Washington was conspicuously absent, but it was certainly paying attention. American officials and analysts noted that the SCO summit could set the tone for other upcoming forums, such as the Quad summit that India is slated to host later in 2025 . Every handshake between Modi and Xi, every smile between Xi and Putin, was scrutinized for its implications on U.S. strategy. While India remains a key partner for the U.S., the optics of Modi in deep conversation with Xi – just days after U.S. tariffs hit India – highlighted the risk of pushing New Delhi away . Western diplomats also took note of China’s success in courting other U.S. partners: for instance, Egypt and Qatar’s leaders showed up in Tianjin, and even Turkey’s Erdoğan (a NATO member) attended the summit, if not the parade . This reflects a broader trend of U.S. allies hedging their bets and engaging with China’s initiatives.

In the end, the 2025 SCO summit in China and its surrounding events painted a portrait of an emerging world order – one that is more fragmented yet more multipolar. On one side, the Western bloc still exists (G7, NATO, AUKUS and the like), but on the other, a loose but growing network of nations is aligning through institutions like SCO and BRICS to amplify their voice . The presence of India – a democracy with ties to the West – alongside authoritarian regimes like China and Russia at the summit showed that this is not a simplistic East-vs-West Cold War dichotomy, but rather a complex realignment of interests. Countries are increasingly willing to defy traditional geopolitical camps to pursue their own advantage. As Xi Jinping bid farewell to his guests after the parade, he could claim a diplomatic victory: China had successfully orchestrated a week showcasing its role as a powerful convener in global affairs, capable of challenging U.S. primacy not through confrontation alone but by rallying others around a shared vision of the future .

Outlook

The late August 2025 SCO summit in Tianjin – capped by the spectacle in Beijing – will be remembered as a defining moment in the shift towards a new global order. It solidified a narrative of the “rise of the rest,” with China, Russia, India, and others asserting that they will jointly shape 21st-century norms and institutions. While internal frictions persist within this cohort, their collective stance is increasingly clear: the post-Cold War era of uncontested U.S. dominance is over. In its place, a more pluralistic and at times contentious international system is taking form, one in which Beijing is eager to play ringmaster. The SCO summit showcased both the promise and the complexity of this evolving order – one where statecraft, economic pragmatism, military might, and even historical memory are wielded in concert to redraw the geopolitical map . It was, in essence, a preview of a world where power is more widely distributed, and where Eastern-led multilateral gatherings can rival the influence and pageantry of any Western summit. The Dragon has convened the Elephant and the Bear, and together with a host of other nations, they are charting a course into a future beyond the unipolar moment.